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Abstract
One of the primary goals of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has been
the reduction and elimination of health disparities, generally defined as population-level health
differences that adversely affect disadvantaged groups, including disparities associated with sex
and gender. Many of PPACA’s general provisions — expanded access to public and private
insurance coverage, guarantee issue and pricing reforms, and coverage mandates — were
expected to reduce barriers and eliminate discriminatory practices targeting or disproportionately
impacting women and transgender individuals. Provisions like the Women’s Health Amendment,
which mandated women’s preventive healthcare to be covered without cost sharing, and the even
broader prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, disability, age,
and sex in Section 1557 of PPACA also promote gender equity.
Prior to PPACA, a patchwork of federal laws targeted only certain areas for sex
nondiscrimination protections and enforcement, notably employment (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964) and education (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). Such laws
had been used to address healthcare access to some degree, but their scope has been limited. For
example, Title VII has been used to eliminate coverage exclusions that uniquely harm women,
such as pregnancy-related care, but only in employment-based plans.

Section 1557 filled this critical gap by creating a new healthcare-specific prohibition of sex
discrimination. Prohibiting sex and gender discrimination was a dominant focus of the May 2016
Final Rule implementing Section 1557 (2016 Final Rule) issued by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Notably, the 2016 Final Rule
clarified that Section 1557’s sex discrimination provision would protect transgender individuals
from discrimination on the basis of gender identity in healthcare delivery and insurance.
By contrast, in June 2020, OCR issued new regulations that dramatically narrowed Section
1557’s scope, including interpreting the prohibition on sex discrimination to not include
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or transgender status (2020 Final Rule). In
addition, the 2020 Final Rule significantly expanded the grounds for providers of care or
insurance to obtain exemptions from nondiscrimination mandates.
The battle over the scope of sex discrimination protection is also playing out in the courts.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently weighed in on this issue, though not in the
healthcare context. In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, a consolidation of three high-profile
cases involving claims of sex discrimination in employment under Title VII, the Supreme Court
affirmed a definition of sex discrimination consistent with the 2016 Final Rule. In a 6-3 decision,
the Court held that an employer that fires an individual merely for being transgender or gay
violates the sex discrimination prohibition under Title VII. Bostock’s implications for Section
1557 are significant, but the fact that it is a non-healthcare case means the battle over the scope
of sex discrimination protections under Section 1557 will continue.
This article examines the current regulatory and litigation landscape for defining and enforcing
PPACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination in healthcare. It considers three key questions
engaging regulators and courts at this time, which are discussed below: Who is protected? What
kind of activity is prohibited or required? How should religious objections to these requirements
be balanced against the health and equity interests advanced by nondiscrimination protections?
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